Crowdsourced reputation/voting - Revision history

Woozle: /* Weighted Average */ xref to chain of trust

2011-06-05T13:29:54Z

Weighted Average: xref to chain of trust

Woozle: extracted stuff that doesn't belong here -- goes in online voting fraud

2011-06-05T13:22:41Z

extracted stuff that doesn't belong here -- goes in online voting fraud

Woozle: /* Local Centralization */ conclude that this is the best starting system; remove draft notice

2011-06-05T12:21:47Z

Local Centralization: conclude that this is the best starting system; remove draft notice

Woozle: /* Weighted Average */ tweak of mathsplanation

2011-06-05T12:17:20Z

Weighted Average: tweak of mathsplanation

Woozle: /* Local Centralization */ modified in light of "context" section

2011-06-05T12:14:43Z

Local Centralization: modified in light of "context" section

Woozle: local centralization

2011-06-05T12:06:51Z

local centralization

Woozle: moar explanashunses

2011-06-05T02:52:37Z

moar explanashunses

Woozle: just the seed; more later

2011-06-04T02:43:22Z

just the seed; more later

New page

==About==
[[Crowdsourced reputation]] is a possible solution to the problem of [[solves::online voter fraud]]. There are a number of different ways to do it, but the key features are:

* Every voter may indicate whether any other voter is known to them personally.
* Only voters who are given sufficient recognition by other voters are (essentially) allowed to vote.
{{draft}}

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:29, 5 June 2011
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	Another solution might be to penalize users whose ratings (of other users) "buck the system" by legitimizing a user others have explicitly rated low. This suggests the question of under what circumstances one user should "downrate" another, rather than not rating them at all (equivalent to saying "I don't know this person, but I have no reason to think they're fake").		Another solution might be to penalize users whose ratings (of other users) "buck the system" by legitimizing a user others have explicitly rated low. This suggests the question of under what circumstances one user should "downrate" another, rather than not rating them at all (equivalent to saying "I don't know this person, but I have no reason to think they're fake").
		+
		+	Looked at one way, this method uses [[chains of trust]] to broaden its reach and provide a cross-check.

@@ Line 7: / Line 7: @@
 There's a simple way to get each user's score, and a simple exploit for that method. There are a number of more complicated ways that are less vulnerable to that exploit.
 ==Methods==
 ===Simple Average===
@@ Line 49: / Line 41: @@
 Another solution might be to penalize users whose ratings (of other users) "buck the system" by legitimizing a user others have explicitly rated low. This suggests the question of under what circumstances one user should "downrate" another, rather than not rating them at all (equivalent to saying "I don't know this person, but I have no reason to think they're fake").

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:21, 5 June 2011
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	One thing to note is that this scheme gives a certain amount of (limited) power only to those with sufficient technical skills to set up a node. While any kind of power is subject to possible misuse, the ability to leave the node in cases of mismanagement serves as a sharp check on this power -- and ''practical'' technical competence (as opposed to ''certified'' technical competence) as a pre-requisite for limited power seems refreshingly meritocratic when compared to the current political system.		One thing to note is that this scheme gives a certain amount of (limited) power only to those with sufficient technical skills to set up a node. While any kind of power is subject to possible misuse, the ability to leave the node in cases of mismanagement serves as a sharp check on this power -- and ''practical'' technical competence (as opposed to ''certified'' technical competence) as a pre-requisite for limited power seems refreshingly meritocratic when compared to the current political system.
−	~~{{draft}}~~	+
		+	This system seems like the best system to use early on, while the software is still in a state of testing and tweaking, since it will require less programming work to produce something usable.

@@ Line 34: / Line 34: @@
 This is where it gets tricky. Instead of taking each user's rating of another user (A<sub>x:y</sub>) as being of equal value, we use ''that'' user's rating as a value-multiplier. The ratings of users with low recognition will be counted less than users with higher recognition.
-Again, some math for those who like that sort of thing:
+Again, some math for those who like that sort of thing (where ratings range from zero to some positive number):
 {| align=center
 |-
-|Assuming ratings are from 0 to +1:
+| E<sub>x</sub> = (SUM(A<sub>x:y</sub> * E<sub>y</sub>) for [all y != x]) / SUM(E<sub>y</sub>)
 |}
@@ Line 52: / Line 49: @@
 Another solution might be to penalize users whose ratings (of other users) "buck the system" by legitimizing a user others have explicitly rated low. This suggests the question of under what circumstances one user should "downrate" another, rather than not rating them at all (equivalent to saying "I don't know this person, but I have no reason to think they're fake").
 ===Local Centralization===
 A simpler solution that addresses all of the above issues is for each node to have a supreme [[dictator-sysop]] deciding which users are real and which are not, deploying whatever assistance or tools s/he feels are helpful in making that determination -- remembering that there would be many nodes for each user to choose from, and that any user or group of users who become disaffected with the way recognition is handled would be free to fly off and open another branch.

@@ Line 53: / Line 53: @@
 Another solution might be to penalize users whose ratings (of other users) "buck the system" by legitimizing a user others have explicitly rated low. This suggests the question of under what circumstances one user should "downrate" another, rather than not rating them at all (equivalent to saying "I don't know this person, but I have no reason to think they're fake").
 ===Local Centralization===
-A simpler solution that addresses all of the above issues is simply to have many smaller [[social node]]s, with each node having a supreme [[dictator-sysop]] deciding which users are real and which are not, deploying whatever assistance or tools s/he feels are helpful in making that determination. Any user would be free to find a node whose userbase includes people known to them, who would then grant recognition on that basis.
+A simpler solution that addresses all of the above issues is for each node to have a supreme [[dictator-sysop]] deciding which users are real and which are not, deploying whatever assistance or tools s/he feels are helpful in making that determination -- remembering that there would be many nodes for each user to choose from, and that any user or group of users who become disaffected with the way recognition is handled would be free to fly off and open another branch.
 The obvious exploit here is that a single user could gain recognition at multiple social nodes and thereby have more than their "fair" share of influence, especially if they are a gregarious person known to many people with different interests. While this would be a problem if we want to keep strictly to a rule of "one person, one voteshare", it seems to me that the extra effort involved in getting to know more people and spending more time discussing things means that each extra voteshare of influence would be paid for in terms of participation-time, which is something we want to encourage. This is something to watch, but I do not yet see any mechanisms by which it could actually cause a problem.
 {{draft}}

@@ Line 3: / Line 3: @@
 * Every voter may indicate whether any other voter is known to them personally.
-* Only voters who are given sufficient recognition by other voters are (essentially) allowed to vote.
+* Voters who do not have sufficient [[/recognition|recognition]] by other voters are (essentially) prevented from voting.
 {{draft}}